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Introduction 
 
If corruption is significant for the welfare of less developed countries (where bribery can 
help to perpetuate relative states of lawlessness and insecurity which in turn act as brakes 
on economic development), then its potential significance is hardly less for the older 
established democracies of places like western Europe, simply because of what is at stake 
– or might be at stake. Della Porta and Vannucci have argued, with respect to liberal 
democratic regimes, that corruption in a democracy is in effect the corruption of a 
democracy, meaning that where corruption occurs in these regimes, its effects, or 
potential effects, are such as to undermine, or considerably weaken their claim to be 
‘democratic’ at all. 
 
However, it is important to distinguish between two ‘levels’ of impact in the sense 
that one can have corruption that is exposed and corruption that is not exposed, and the 
effects of the exposure of corruption will not be the same as the effects of the underlying 
phenomenon. Moreover, the exposure of corruption is only likely to have any significant 
effect if it provides the basis for scandal where the latter requires: 1) the transgression or 
presumed transgression of values, norms or moral codes; 2) by certain people whose 
positions make them ‘scandal-prone’; where 3) ‘non-participants’ disapprove of the 
actions/events/incidents and articulate their disapproval by publicly denouncing what has 
happened, or is presumed to have happened. 
 
 The analysis of moral codes and of what publics expect of politicians and public 
officials is therefore crucial for an understanding of the significance of corruption in 
modern democracies. It is crucial for at least two other reasons besides. First, whatever 
else it might mean, the term ‘corruption’ refers to an infringement of rules – where a 
‘rule’ is a criterion of behaviour that indicates right and wrong ways of doing things; is 
something that can only exist in virtue of social interaction, and is something whose 
infringement is to some greater or lesser degree morally condemned in the group whose 
social existence gives rise to it. Therefore, to describe given acts as ‘corrupt’ is to 
condemn them as illegitimate according to the standards of one’s own group or at least 
the group with which one identifies – which in turn means that we cannot know what 
counts as corruption unless we know something about the moral codes of the group to 
which the person seeking to apply this label belongs.1
 
  
 Second, democracies are regimes that are by definition responsive to public 
opinion – but on the other hand, public opinion is not an exogenous variable as far as the 
actions and initiatives of governments are concerned: publics take their cues in terms of 
                                                          
1 The centrality of moral codes to what counts as corruption remains even in the case of those definitions of 
the term that appear to render it independent of such codes: for example,  principal-agent definitions – of 
the most widely used definitions seemingly the most independent of public attitudes – are independent only 
in appearance, for they make the difference between corrupt and non-corrupt actions turn on the principal’s 
– socially informed – decisions about the interests and preferences the agent is to be required to advance. 
 
 3 
their attitudes and policy preferences from what agenda-setting authorities define for 
them as ‘problems’ and from what they define for them as viable means of addressing 
those problems. This means that the problem of responding to corruption and misconduct 
is to a very large extent a problem of the management of public concerns. Indeed, it may 
not be going too far to suggest that political elites are in this area driven less by the desire 
to ensure that the behaviour of those in the public domain is in fact clean (as they 
understand ‘clean’) than by the desire to ensure that it is perceived to be clean. After all, 
anti-corruption measures may be inconvenient in all sorts of ways and their effectiveness 
must (given that corruption is a clandestine activity) always be attended by a degree of 
uncertainty. On the other hand, public disapproval of those in authority undermines that 
authority by definition; and in an age of mediated communication it is a risk that can be 
averted only if the authorities’ attention to it is constant.2
 
     
 Taking its point of departure from these reflections, this paper will discuss, with 
reference to the British case: 
1) what has been responsible for growing levels of concern about corruption and the 
standards of conduct of public office holders since the beginning of the 1990s; 
2) what we know about public perceptions, especially: the kinds of behaviour the public 
sees as acceptable and unacceptable on the part of public office-holders; how far the 
public believes that the behaviour of public office-holders is, in fact, acceptable or 
unacceptable; how far the public believes that public office-holders are effectively 
held responsible and accountable for their conduct; 
3) the impact on perceptions of the policy response that has been influenced by 1) and 2). 
 
 
Growing levels of concern 
 
Cross-nationally, the beginning of the 1990s appeared to mark the start of a growing 
salience of corruption and misconduct as an issue. The following years were marked by a 
number of high-profile scandals – including Tangentopoli in Italy; the various allegations 
of ‘sleaze’ that played a prominent role in the downfall of the Conservatives in Britain; 
the party finance scandal that led to the disgrace of Helmut Kohl in Germany; the 
resignation, in 1999, of the entire EU Commission in the wake of publication of evidence 
of fraud, corruption and mismanagement at senior levels. Transparency International, the 
non-governmental organisation created to fight corruption, began in 1993 (Harrison, nd: 
2). There was growing academic attention to the issue: inserting the expression ‘political 
corruption’ into the search box of the British Library’s integrated on-line catalogue 
throws up 1,266 items – of which no fewer than 1,073 were published in 1990 or later. 
Impressionistically, then, the period since 1990 seems to have been marked by growing 
levels of public concern – and in the British case, these growing levels could be seen in 
three rather precise sets of indicators: survey data; media reports of allegations of 
                                                          
2 There can be little doubt that it was these two conflicting sets of imperatives that lay at the base of what 
was for many years the dominant strain in the strategy of British political elites for dealing with the 
exposure of corruption and misconduct, namely, to treat the perpetrators as ‘rotten apples’: to subject, that 
is, identified cases to investigations that dealt with the offenders – but that also repeatedly insisted on ‘the 
general integrity of institutions and the robustness of the procedures involved in dealing with the offences’ 
(Doig, 2003). 
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misconduct; committees of enquiry and government initiatives of various kinds. 
 
 With regard to survey data, Figure 1 shows Transparency International’s 
Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) scores for the UK from 1995 (the year the CPI was 
launched) through to 2008. As is widely known, the CPI is a ‘poll of polls’ published 
annually on the basis of an analysis of existing polls of international business interests 
and financial journalists and which thus presents a picture of how international business 
perceives levels of corruption in the countries surveyed. A score of 10 means ‘an entirely 
clean country while zero equals a country where business transactions are entirely 
dominated by kickbacks, extortion etc.’ (Transparency International, 1995: 3). As the 
press release, launching the first set of CPI scores pointed out, ‘perceptions may not be a 
fair reflection on the state of affairs, but they are a reality’ (Transparency International, 
1995: 3).  From 1995 to 2001 there is a clear downward trend in the UK’s rating – from 
8.57 to 8.3 – with the score undergoing a sharper decline in the new millennium, down to 
7.7 in 2008. 
 
 Media reports tell a similar story. They offer a good indicator of popular concerns 
and public reactions to acts of official misconduct because newspapers have a financial 
interest in covering matters, and in covering them in a way, that will have an echo with 
their readers. If it is true that media organizations are agenda-setters, providing publics 
with windows on the world, then it is also true that they cannot survive to play this role 
unless they successfully echo back to their audiences, their audiences’ own core values 
and key assumptions. So newspapers faithfully reflect, as well strongly shape public 
opinion.    
 
 We used the LexisNexis Professional on-line database – which contains full-text 
articles from UK national and local newspapers – to explore the occurrence, in Guardian 
headlines, of words such as ‘corrupt’ and ‘bribe’ and their derivations (‘corruption’, 
‘corrupting’, ‘corrupted’, ‘bribery’, ‘bribed’ etc.) over the 25 years from 1984 to 2008. 
The Guardian is a left-of-centre newspaper with a largely middle-class readership having 
above-average levels of educational attainment. As such it has a reputation for avoiding 
the sensationalism of some of the more popular dailies while being sensitive to matters of 
probity in public life. Figure 2 presents the results. There is a clear upward trend 
throughout the period with a peak of 369 relevant headlines in 1997. This was the year of 
the general election in which the Conservatives sought to defend themselves against 
allegations of ‘sleaze’ – an umbrella term covering acts of sexual impropriety, misuse of 
office, and material greed – from a position of weakness which the then Prime Minister 
(PM) had created for them by calling for a reassertion of family values and private 
morality in a ‘back-to-basics’ campaign launched in October 1993. The subsequent 
revelation of conduct on the part of prominent Conservatives that was clearly at variance 
with what the PM was claiming was the party’s core values could not, in an election year, 
have been other than thrust centre stage by journalists for many of whom the unveiling of 
official hypocrisy is seen as a way of pursuing their calling as guardians of the public 
interest (Thomoson, 2000; Moncrieff, 2005). It is interesting that the 1997 peak coincides 
exactly with the CPI trough shown in figure 1. Following an apparent decline in press 
attention to corruption and related matters in the early years of the Labour government 
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that took over from the Conservatives, there has since then been another revival of 
interest. 
  
 Finally, official measures to combat corruption and misconduct must also be 
judged as good indicators of levels of public concern in the British case simply because 
of the way they have been so closely tied to specific scandals and so obviously driven by 
the desire ‘to mollify public concern rather than introduce effective reforms’ (Doig, 1996: 
44) – as descriptions of the most high-profile of the official initiatives taken in the post-
war period soon reveal.  
• In 1948, the Lynskey Tribunal was established following allegations that John 
Belcher, a junior minister at the Board of Trade, had abused his position in 
exchange for gifts and hospitality from Sidney Stanley, a businessman who had 
apparently received thousands of pounds from football pools firms to obtain 
influence with the minister (Day, 2000: 8; Paterson, 2000: 47). Its findings 
forcing the minister to resign, Lynskey led to the establishment of a parliamentary 
‘Committee on Intermediaries’ to examine ‘how far persons are making a 
business of acting as… intermediaries between Government Departments and the 
public, and to report whether the activities of such persons are liable to give rise 
to abuses…’ While the committee recommended that departments constantly 
‘overhaul their control system’, it concluded that disreputable intermediaries were 
‘few in number’ and their activities ‘not on such a scale that a general restriction 
on them [was] justified’ (Committee on Intermediaries, 1950).  
• In 1969, a Commons Select Committee on Members’ Interests was established 
after an MP, Gordon Bagier, had initially denied and then been forced to admit 
being in the pay of a PR firm working for the Greek military government, and it 
was revealed that the firm had told the Greeks that it ‘had a British MP lobbyist 
working behind the scenes to influence other MPs’ (Doig, 1984: 215). Called to 
examine the rules and practices concerning the declaration of MPs’ interests, the 
Select Committee rejected the idea of a register of members’ interests and its 
report was, in any event, shelved.  
• In the early 1970s, a series of revelations, triggered by a petition for bankruptcy 
filed by the architect John Poulson in 1972, led to the Redcliffe-Maud inquiry, the 
Salmon inquiry and two parliamentary inquiries. In essence, Poulson cultivated 
contacts in wide areas of public life in order systematically to corrupt them in the 
pursuit of building and design contracts, and the investigations that his bankruptcy 
precipitated led to the downfall of a string of local councilors and civil servants, 
and three MPs including a government minister. Redcliffe-Maud, set up in 
October 1973, ‘to look at situations in which councilors or officers might be 
involved in conflicts of interest, and at qualifications for council membership’ 
(Doig, 1984: 146) made a number of recommendations none of which were 
debated by Parliament, and only some of which were implemented – but then not 
monitored for effectiveness (Doig, 1996: 44). Salmon too produced a lengthy 
series of recommendations whose implementation was regularly resisted by the 
government of the day. The first parliamentary enquiry, in 1974, established a 
register of MPs financial interests – but then left it up to MPs themselves to 
decide what interests were relevant for registering and subsequently showed itself 
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reluctant to act as the Commons’ policeman in response to media allegations 
(Doig, 1996: 44). The second enquiry, established in 1976 to investigate the 
conduct of the three MPs caught up in the Poulson scandal, found all to have 
fallen short of standards of conduct reasonably to be expected – but, with Leader 
of the Commons, Michael Foot, urging the House ‘not to act like a sanctimonious 
lynch mob’, MPs refused to do anything more than simply ‘take note’ of the 
enquiry’s report (Doig, 1984: 154-5).   
 
 If all this suggests that it is reasonable to take degrees of effective action as being 
indicative of levels of public concern (suggesting that the authorities have been forced to 
move beyond mere tokenism), then 1994 represents a sea change, for it was the year that 
saw the establishment of the Committee on Standards in Public Life (then known by the 
name of its chairperson, as the Nolan Committee). This came about as the result of a long 
series of episodes of ‘sleaze’, a term which, by bringing disparate issues into a single 
category, as mentioned, served thereby to focus media attention upon them (Doig, 1996: 
50). An advisory, non-departmental body of the Government (ANDB) – that is, a body 
whose remit is to provide ministers with advice on a particular policy area – Nolan’s 
terms of reference were to  
 
examine current concerns about standards of conduct of all holders of public 
office, including arrangements relating to financial and commercial activities, and 
make recommendations as to any changes in present arrangements which might 
be required to ensure the highest standards of propriety in public life. 
 
 Nolan differed from the previous initiatives described above in three important 
respects: (a) its longevity (b) the nature of its recommendations and (c) the impact of its 
work: 
(a) When the Committee was set up, the Prime Minister envisaged that it would 
remain in being as a standing body ‘to advise the Government of the day’ 
(Cabinet Office, 2001: 3) – though as an ANDB it is subject to quinquennial 
review to establish ‘the continuing need for, and suitability of, the body for its 
purposes’ (Cabinet Office, 2001: 2). The first review, in 2000, concluded that 
there was a ‘continuing need to monitor the ethical environment’ (Cabinet Office, 
2001: 6) and in January 2007, the Committee published its eleventh report. 
Whereas the bodies described in the foregoing paragraphs tended to be wound up 
once they had fulfilled their terms of reference, the Committee on Standards has, 
in the words of the 2000 review report, ‘become part of [the] fabric’ ‘it was put in 
place to review’ (Cabinet Office, 2001: 6). 
(b) While some of the Committee’s recommendations have reflected – through its 
calls for codes of conduct and such like – a traditional emphasis on securing 
standards through discretion and self-regulation (on the assumption that values 
and standards generally remain sound), it has arguably been more willing than the 
previous bodies mentioned to look at the procedures and organisational 
arrangements needed to underpin these standards. This is not the place to go into a 
detailed list of its proposals, but significantly, as a result of its early 
recommendations, ‘Parliament agreed in October 1995 to the creation of a new 
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Committee on Standards and Privileges to replace the existing Committees on 
Members’ Interests and on Privileges’. It also agreed to appoint a Parliamentary 
Commissioner for Standards, to place a ban on MPs lobbying on behalf of outside 
interests solely for payment, and to record MPs’ outside earnings (within given 
bands) in the Register of Members’ Interests (Doig, 2003). The Committee 
subsequently recommended that bribery in relation to MPs be criminalized3
(c) Through its emphasis on the standards of conduct to be expected of public office-
holders, the Committee’s work has arguably contributed to the emergence of the 
new public management with its emphasis on quality of service delivery generally, 
and thus on performance indicators, external auditing and a perception of the 
citizen’s relationship to the state as being first and foremost that of a consumer of 
government services. If this in turn has led to the development of growing 
expectations about responsiveness,
 and in 
recognition of the need for a more proactive control environment, it has taken an 
equally prescriptive approach in its reviews of other areas such as local government 
(Doig, 2003). 
4
 
 and about citizens’ individual rights in their 
interaction with public service-providers then, for this and other reasons we shall 
explain in more detail in the penultimate section, it may also have contributed to a 
growing cynicism about public life generally – a feeling that, in areas from 
education to the health service and party funding, values of integrity and service 
cannot be relied upon and, in the absence of external regulations and controls, will 
almost certainly be swept aside by the pursuit of private interests.     
 Survey data, media reports and government initiatives all, then, serve to make a 
strong case for the existence of a growing level of public anxiety about the integrity of 
public office holders since the early 1990s. What has caused it? The answer is necessarily 
speculative, but four factors seem important. First, we have already noted the growing 
attention of the mass media to issues of corruption and integrity, and it is not 
unreasonable to suggest that this, in turn, is related to the end of the Cold War (a 
suggestion that would help to make sense of the fact that the growth in public anxiety 
appears to be cross-national, not merely British – as Figure 3 suggests). The end of the 
Cold War will have been important because of what it meant for the deep-seated 
ideological conflicts between left and right which the power struggle between the US and 
the USSR at the level of international politics had served to underpin. Everywhere, policy 
differences between mainstream parties of the left and right are much harder to identify 
than in the past and this means that the terrain of political conflict has to a degree shifted 
from that of policy to that of morality with parties increasingly attempting to compete 
with each other by throwing mud and attempting to damage each other by fomenting 
scandal, as the Lewinsky affair in America showed so forcefully – a phenomenon that 
                                                          
3 In deference to the separation-of-powers principle, MPs had been beyond the reach of the main body of 
relevant legislation, the 1889, 1906 and 1916 Corruption Acts. 
 
4 ‘…the proportion of consumers who expect any complaint they make in person to be dealt with either 
“immediately” or on the “same day” has increased from 56% in 2001 to 65% in 2003… consumers in the 
same survey identified “Government” as the second worst industry for handling complaints effectively…’ 
(DCA, 2004: 23).  
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Ginsberg and Shefter (2002) have called ‘politics by other means’. 
 
 Second, this tendency has probably been reinforced by two interlinked sets of 
developments in politics and the media. First, there has been the shift from ‘party-’ to 
‘candidate-centred’ campaigning – declining ideological conflict having shifted attention 
from position to valence issues and thus to candidates’ competence; television and other 
electronic media, by allowing candidates to appeal directly to voters, having diminished 
the requirement for good party organisation and thus the attention to party itself in 
campaigns. Second, development of the mass media of communications has rendered the 
lives of the individuals who walk on the public stage ‘much more visible than they ever 
were in the past’ (Thompson, 2000: 6). Not only have they detached publicness from co-
presence and allowed distant others to be audible and visible at the moment they act, but 
most importantly, the electronic media have made possible a shift from rhetorical 
aloofness to mediated intimacy, through which politicians can present themselves not just 
as leaders, but as human beings – and the more politicians have sought to present 
themselves as ‘one of us’, the more their audiences have been inclined to assess them in 
terms of their character as individuals (Thompson, 2000: 39-41). True, television has 
been around for decades. But it is only since somewhere in the 1960s that exposure to it 
has effectively been universal and thus only since round about 1990 that the entire 
electorate has consisted of persons for whom televised politics has ever been a routine 
aspect of their experience. 
 
 Third, the past twenty years have arguably witnessed change of unprecedented 
rapidity in public values of all kinds, with concomitant changes in the kinds of behaviour 
the public regards as acceptable and unacceptable. The combined effect of these twin 
developments may have been to make it very difficult for politicians and other public 
officials to know exactly where the line between right and wrong is drawn – the result 
being a growing number of corruption scandals of various kinds. Significantly influenced 
by globalisation, normative uncertainty will also have fed anxiety about the integrity of 
public office holders by raising doubts about the extent to which publicly pronounced 
values reflect what office holders actually do: No more ‘a self-contained source of 
sovereign political power and normative autonomy’, the national state continues to claim 
to defend public against private interests within its borders, even while including, 
protecting and bowing to powerful private interests beyond its borders (Tsoukalas, 2006: 
40). 
 
 Finally, the growth in media attention to issues of corruption and integrity, and 
thus the growing public anxiety, may reflect an objective increase in the incidence of 
misconduct itself. There are at least two (related) reasons for thinking that this may have 
happened. One has to do with the legacy of the Thatcher years. These have bequeathed a 
political culture in which ‘the encouragement of financial gain as an indicator of worth, 
has placed a premium on self-centred secularism and materialism’ (Doig, 2003), as well 
as bequeathing an unbending belief in government circles that ‘private sector values, 
procedures and practices [provide] the best framework for the delivery of public services 
either by the private or public sectors’ (Doig and Wilson, 1995: 17). Several official 
reports in the 1990s expressed concerns about the possible impact of such a background 
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on standards in public life. Meanwhile, it is possible that the same political culture ‘of 
fragmented “free rider” attitudes in everyday life’ has contributed to the well-known 
decline in party membership of recent years, bringing increased financial pressure on 
parties less able to rely on ‘free contributions of funds and energy’ and forced 
increasingly to rely on the services of paid professionals (Tsoukalas, 2006: 46).5
 
 Support 
for the thesis of cash-strapped parties bowing to illegitimate influence appears to be 
offered by the growing salience, among instances of presumed misconduct, of allegations 
relating to party funding – an issue that has itself acquired growing salience since the 
PM’s 1997 decision to extend to it the terms of reference of the Standards Committee.         
 
Public perceptions 
 
As Mortimore (1995: 31) notes, evidence about public perceptions of the conduct of 
politicians is sparser before than after about 1985 and this in itself is telling of a change 
in the climate of opinion: ‘If no polls were carried out to determine whether the public 
thought MPs were corrupt, one reason may well have been that few people were 
suggesting that they were’. The question that exercises us here is how the changed 
climate has been articulated in terms of the public’s views about: what is acceptable on 
the part of public office holders, how far their behaviour in fact conforms to it and how 
likely they are to be held responsible if it does not so conform. Our data come from the 
national surveys of public attitudes towards the standards of conduct of public office 
holders that were carried out, in 2003-2004 and in 2005-2006, for the Committee on 
Standards. 
 
 The British are, it would seem, rather strict in terms of the standards of behaviour 
they expect of their public officials. Not surprisingly, overwhelming majorities (2005-06 
survey) think it ‘very’ or ‘extremely’ important that MPs and government ministers 
should not use their power for their own personal gain (93.3 percent) and should not take 
bribes (96.9 percent). However, it is also the case that large majorities think it 
unreasonable, in voting in Parliament, for MPs to ‘take into account’ what would benefit 
their families (84.1 percent); how their decisions might affect their chances of getting a 
job outside politics (83.8 percent); how the decision might affect their political careers 
(74.9 percent), and even what will make their party more popular with the general public 
(61.2 percent). While the first two of these results are understandable in that they relate to 
conduct that could be more or less clearly construed as ‘corrupt’ in some sense, the last 
two speak eloquently to the rather rigid nature of attitudes towards integrity: from a more 
relaxed perspective, it might be thought unrealistic to expect an MP never to ‘take into 
account’ the likely personal consequences of a decision and indeed that consequences 
such as the last two are part of the ‘normal’ mechanisms for ensuring that public 
decisions remain in tune with majority wishes in a democracy. For some (11.9 and 16.3 
percent respectively), the demand for moral rectitude even extends to the beliefs that it 
would be unacceptable for a council official to encourage a friend to apply for a council 
                                                          
5 The Electoral Commission (2004: 9) cites data suggesting that Labour Party membership declined from 
405,238 in 1997 to 214,952 in 2003, membership of the Liberal Democrats from 100,000 to 73,305, and 
Conservative Party membership from 400,000 to 320,000. 
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job for which s/he thinks the friend would be suited, or tell the friend where they can find 
publicly available information about the job (2003-04 survey). Moreover, the British 
appear to demand a higher standard of conduct of those who walk the public stage than 
they would be prepared to tolerate in others: 59.9 percent of respondents to the 2005-06 
survey thought it was ‘very’, or ‘extremely’ important that MPs and government 
ministers ‘set a good example for others in their private lives’, 54.6 percent that senior 
public officials did so.  
   
 Unfortunately, people do not, by and large, see those in public life as actually 
living up to the expectations they have of them: 91.8 percent believe that at least ‘a few’ 
MPs use their power for their own personal gain, 48.7 percent that ‘about half’ or more 
do so. And if only 8 per cent believe that ‘all’ or ‘most’ MPs take bribes, then 71.8 per 
cent believe that at least ‘a few’ do so (2005-06 survey). Not surprisingly, then, only a 
minority – 28.3 percent – would ‘generally trust’ MPs to ‘tell the truth’, although 
significantly, the proportion climbs to 45.8 percent when the question is asked about 
‘your local MP’. This element of actual or potential ‘closeness’ to the affairs of the 
respondent personally appears to have a big impact on perceptions. Thus, while large 
majorities would generally trust family doctors, head teachers, judges and senior police 
officers to tell the truth, only minorities – between about a fifth and a third in each case – 
would likewise trust senior council managers, government ministers, and top civil 
servants.  
 
 If mistrust of the ‘remoter’ public officials is, then, rather widespread, the 
expectation must be that few will have much confidence in the mechanisms for holding 
such officials responsible for their conduct. The data appears to bear out this expectation. 
Thus while a majority of 55.1 percent (2005-06 survey) are ‘very’ or ‘fairly’ confident 
that the authorities are committed to improving standards, nevertheless, most are ‘not 
very’ or ‘not at all’ confident that the authorities will uncover wrongdoing by people in 
public life (54.3 percent) or that, once having uncovered the wrongdoing, the authorities 
will punish the persons concerned (58.2 percent). If people feel the wrongdoing by public 
office holders will be uncovered, then it is the media they feel will do the uncovering, not 
the authorities: twice as many (80.7 percent) are ‘fairly’ or ‘very’ confident that the 
media will uncover wrongdoing as are ‘fairly’ or ‘very’ confident that the authorities will 
do so (42.2 percent). 
 
 How are we to interpret these data? Three things stand out. First, the attitudes in 
question appear to be rather stable. Writing over a decade ago, Mortimore (1995: 31, 32, 
40) noted, as we have done, the findings of surveys suggesting that the public took ‘a 
strict view’ of what was acceptable in public life; that the public were also ‘quite 
convinced that British politicians’ were ‘not living up to those expectations’, and that 
‘[d]istrust of politicians naturally enough [lead] to distrust of political institutions’. With 
all due allowance for variations in the response categories, it is striking how similar the 
ordering of groups the public would ‘generally trust to tell the truth’ is in 2003 to the 
ordering the same question produced in 1983 and 1993: Table 1. Over the twenty-year 
period, while most groups show an improvement in the extent to which they are trusted, 
their relative positions stay virtually the same.  
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 Second, people appear to relate to public office holders and political 
representatives almost as if they were parental figures. Thus, on the one hand they expect 
senior office holders to act as role models for them, exemplifying much higher standards 
than those they would tolerate in others – but then they show a level of cynicism about 
how the office holders actually behave that appears to be mainly a function of lack of 
familiarity with their work. as soon they are asked to reflect on groups ‘closer to home’, 
exaggeratedly negative perceptions disappear.6
 
 
 And since this is the case, it is not surprising – third – that for some at least, the 
beliefs they hold are quite contradictory. For example, approaching a third of the public 
in 2003 trusted neither elected nor appointed officials at either the local (councillors, 
senior council managers) or national levels (MPs, ministers, top civil servants). Yet of 
these, 26.3 percent nevertheless rated ‘the standards of conduct of public office holders in 
Britain’ overall as ‘quite’ or ‘very’ high, only 20.1 percent rating them as ‘quite’ or 
‘very’ low. Again, 28 percent said they trusted MPs generally to tell the truth, but then 39 
per cent of these went on to suggest that half or more used their power for their own 
personal gain, 13 percent suggesting that half or more actually took bribes!  
 
 We seem, therefore, to be in the presence of generalised impressions about public 
officials (that may get ‘better’ or ‘worse’ with time) rather than anything that could be 
appropriately described as specific beliefs influenced by knowledge – which suggests that 
public perceptions of corruption are more than likely part of a culture of mistrust of 
public office holders generally. This culture appears, in turn, to be widely shared across 
sociological categories and to be rooted in a lack of feelings of political efficacy – as the 
data presented in Tables 2 and 3 suggest. Taking trust in MPs to tell the truth as our 
dependent variable the figures in Table 2 show that socio-demographic variables such as 
age, education and socio-economic status appear not to be significantly related to it. The 
only significant predictor of lack of trust is being aged between 55 and 64, all the other 
factors being non significant (p >0.05). Behavioural and attitudinal characteristics, such 
as interest in current affairs, a sense of political efficacy and trust in others generally, tell 
a different story. While interest in current affairs makes little difference, the extent to 
which respondents feel they can influence political decisions, and whether or not they are 
able to exhibit interpersonal trust, do have an effect.  
 
 In order to assess the impact of each of the significant factors net of the impact of 
each of the others, we entered them into a logistic regression model with trust in MPs as 
the dependent variable where ‘do not trust’ = 1; ‘trust’ = 0. The result was that the 
variables ‘age 54-65’ and ‘can influence decisions: agree’ were non-significant. This 
being the case, the model was rerun without them, with the results shown in Table 3. 
These suggest that, as compared to those who strongly agree, those who disagree that 
                                                          
6 People appear to relate to public office holders and political representatives almost as if they were 
parental figures. Thus, on the one hand they expect senior office holders to act as role models for them, 
exemplifying much higher standards than those they would tolerate in others – but then they show a level 
of cynicism about how the office holders actually behave that appears to be mainly a function of lack of 
familiarity with their work. 
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they ‘can influence decisions affecting this country’ are between one-and-a-half and two-
and-a-half times as likely to believe that MPs cannot be trusted to tell the truth. 
Meanwhile, those who strongly disagree that they ‘can influence decisions affecting this 
country’ are between 1.6 and 3.8 times as likely as those who strongly agree to believe 
that MPs cannot be trusted to tell the truth – while those who believe that generally 
speaking ‘you can’t be too careful dealing with people’ are between one-and-a-half and 
two-and-a-half times as likely to hold this belief as those who feel that generally speaking 
‘most people can be trusted’.  
  
 A sense of being unable to count politically, mistrust of public office-holders and 
negative perceptions of their integrity all appear, then, to be interlinked. And as we now 
suggest, they are likely to have been augmented by the recent policy measures designed 
to respond to public concerns. 
 
 
The impact of the policy response 
 
Since the Standards Committee was set up, there have, as compared to the past, been a 
vast number of reforms in the area of corruption and probity, many of them directly 
inspired by the work of the Committee itself. They include:  
• The July 1995 House of Commons Resolution endorsing a code of conduct for 
Members (which now sets out detailed rules on registering interests and avoiding 
conflicts of interest) and its November 1995 Resolution imposing a ban on paid 
advocacy in Parliament. 
• Legislation, in the Public Interest Disclosure Act 1998, offering legal protection 
to workers who ‘blow the whistle’ on wrongdoing. 
• The Local Government Act 2000. This, besides setting up the above-mentioned 
Standards Board for England, obliged local authorities to adopt codes of conduct 
setting out rules governing the behaviour of their members and incorporating the 
provisions of a model code of conduct which was approved by Parliament in 
November 2001. The Act also obliged the authorities to set up standards 
committees (with responsibility for overseeing observance of the codes of conduct) 
and required members to declare financial interests in registers of members’ 
interests. Finally, the Act obliged members to disclose interests before taking part 
in any business of the authority relating to that interest, obliging authorities to 
prevent or restrict the participation of members with interests, in business relating 
to those interests. 
• In an attempt to introduce greater transparency into party-funding arrangements, 
and to encourage public confidence that influence was not being bought with 
parties, Parliament passed the Political Parties, Elections and Referendums Act 
2000. In setting up the Electoral Commission, the Act obliged parties to submit 
periodic statements of their accounts to the Commission and placed a ban on 
foreign or anonymous donations to parties. Non-financial forms of support were 
to count as donations and the Act introduced, for the first time, overall spending 
limits (as opposed to limits, which already existed, on spending by single 
candidates) by parties in election campaigns. 
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• Following recommendations contained in the Standards Committee’s First Report, 
ministers have been placed under an obligation to give notice, to the Advisory 
Committee on Business Appointments (ACBA), of any intentions to take up 
within two years of leaving office, any alternative employment.7
• The Freedom of Information Act 2000. From January 2005, the Act created a 
general right of access, subject to some absolute and some qualified exemptions, 
to information held by public bodies. Applicants who feel that their requests for 
information have been wrongly turned down, may appeal to the Information 
Commissioner, an independent official who reports annually to Parliament and 
whose Office oversees operation of the Act. 
 However, unlike 
civil servants, ministers are not obliged to accept ACBA’s advice. 
• The 2001 Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act – incorporating the OECD’s 
1999 Convention on the bribery of overseas officials. This obliges signatory states 
to make it illegal for companies based within their borders to attempt to bribe 
foreign public officials in the course of international business transactions. 
 
 We have already seen data suggesting that the reforms – despite their number and 
range – have not been especially effective in assuaging public concerns: CPI scores have 
continued to decline, media attention to questions of integrity continues to grow. The 
survey evidence we have just examined can be interpreted in the same way. In 1993, just 
before the Standards Committee was established, teachers, civil servants, government 
ministers and business leaders were trusted to tell the truth generally by 84, 37, 11 and 32 
percent respectively (Mortimore, 1985: Table 2). In 2003, according to the Standards 
Committee data, teachers, ‘top civil servants’, government ministers and ‘people who run 
large companies’ were trusted to tell the truth generally by 83, 37, 24 and 23 percent 
respectively. In addition, the period of the above-mentioned reforms has coincided with a 
continuation of declines in electoral participation – which can be taken as a reasonably 
good indicator of feelings of political efficacy and trust, which in turn appear, as we have 
said, to be correlated with perceptions of integrity. Figure 4 provides further evidence 
that they are indeed correlated and that the correlation goes beyond the British case. 
 
 In looking for clues as to why the reform efforts may have been so ineffective, one 
is struck, first of all, by the way in which they have originated in the work of a wide 
range of policy-formulating institutions, whose number is large. They include: 
• the Office of the Parliamentary Commissioner for Standards, set up in 1995, the 
remit of which includes monitoring the operation of the Code of Conduct and 
Rules relating to the conduct of MPs and where appropriate, proposing 
modifications to the Commons’ Select Committee on Standards and Privileges 
(which oversees the work of the Office). 
• the Propriety and Ethics Team within the Cabinet Office. Its responsibilities 
include ‘maintaining an effective working relationship between government and 
the Committee on Standards in Public Life, including advising the Prime Minister 
on its work’. It is also responsible for ‘providing advice to departments about 
                                                          
7 ACBA ‘was set up in 1975 to scrutinise the movement of senior civil servants into business positions 
where their inside knowledge of government might be of commercial value’ (http:// 
www.againstcorruption.org/BriefingsItem.asp?id=12964). 
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issues arising under the Ministerial Code, Civil Service Code and Code of 
Conduct for Special Advisors’ (Cabinet Office, 2005: 44). 
• The Office of the Commissioner for Public Appointments, set up in November 
1995, with the remit of establishing a code of conduct for ministerial 
appointments to public bodies, thus enabling it to ensure that such appointments 
are made on the basis of merit after fair and open competition.  
• The Electoral Commission. Set up by the Political Parties, Elections and 
Referendums Act 2000, its remit includes keeping under review and advising the 
Home Secretary on the law relating to party funding, political advertising and 
other matters associated with the conduct of elections. 
• The Standards Board for England. Set up in March 2001 its remit is to ensure that 
members of local authorities adhere to ethical standards (including those relating 
to abuse of office, misuse of resources, and conflicts of interest) and to investigate 
allegations ‘that members’ conduct may have fallen short of the required 
standards’ (www.standardsboard.co.uk). 
In addition to the above, each of the so-called ‘devolved institutions’ (that is, the National 
Assembly for Wales, the Northern Ireland Assembly, the Scottish Parliament and the 
Greater London Assembly) have standards commissioners and standards committees with 
functions very similar to those of the House of Commons’ Parliamentary Commissioner 
and its Select Committee on Standards and Privileges. set up since the Standards 
Committee,     
 
 Moreover, in formulating policy, these bodies typically operate in rather 
democratic and consultative manner. For example, the Committee on Standards itself 
conducts most of its work through a continuous series of consultations involving: the 
publication of ‘questions and issues’ documents to which it invites written responses; 
public hearings, and meetings with specialists and experts. Each consultation round then 
culminates in the publication of a report and recommendations (which are then presented 
to Parliament as a ‘Command Paper’8
 
).  In addition, it has responded to its remit ‘to 
examine current concerns’ about standards by commissioning research into what the 
public sees as the key issues in this area (the two surveys analysed in the preceding 
section). Likewise, the Electoral Commission has also drawn on investigations of public 
attitudes in formulating its recommendations. Most notably, it commissioned a survey, 
carried out in May 2003, to measure public knowledge of the system of party funding and 
their attitudes towards the way the system might develop in the future, together with a 
follow-up series of focus groups in November 2003. 
 Now it is probably not be stretching credibility too far to suggest that the effects 
of all these consultative and reform activities may have been paradoxical. That is, they 
are likely, on the one hand, to have given the relevant bodies an especially detailed 
understanding of public perceptions and attitudes. For example, having decided to repeat 
its surveys on a bi-annual basis to track changes in perceptions and attitudes over time, 
the Standards Committee has been able to conclude from the first two surveys ‘that the 
                                                          
8 That is, a paper ‘laid before Parliament as conveying information or decisions which the Government 
think should be drawn to the attention of one or both Houses of Parliament’ (House of Commons, 2003: 2). 
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public place a high priority on a much broader definition of honesty than is currently 
described by the Committee’ (Graham, 2004)9
 
 and that related to this, the key public 
concern in relation to standards currently has less to do with financial probity than it has 
to do with spin. Through its research, the Electoral Commission has been able to obtain 
confirmation that levels of awareness of party funding arrangements are low and that 
attitudes are confused and contradictory. Thus while a large majority thought that people 
should have the right to donate to parties, a large majority also thought that this was unfair 
as it risked the buying of influence.  Likewise, while concerned that the risk of influence-
buying by the wealthy was a real one, a very large majority (76 percent) was opposed to 
the state funding of parties (Electoral Commission, 2004: 15). The upshot was that in the 
face of public hostility to such a reform, and in awareness of the significance of large 
donations in helping parties overcome the difficulties of covering their costs, the 
Commission in its December 2004 report recommended that the absence of limits on the 
size of permissible donations be allowed to continue (Electoral Commission, 2004). 
 So on the one hand, one’s impression is that the period since the setting up of the 
Standards Committee has seen a wide range of proposals being formulated in accordance 
with consultative principles that have given the authorities detailed knowledge of the 
substance of public anxieties. On the other hand, all this activity may have served to fuel 
rather than curb the anxieties by raising the general salience of the integrity of public 
office-holders as a political issue, keeping it high on the agenda of public discussion. It is 
likely to have done this in several ways. 
 
 First, one result of the reforms described has been to create an ‘institutional ethics 
framework’ all of whose bodies – the Committee on Standards, the Parliamentary 
Commissioner, the Standards Board, the Electoral Commission and so forth – now 
publish annual reports ‘which ultimately inform the public on the ethical state of the 
country’ (Doig, 2004: 446).  
 
 Second, the paradoxical effect of a growing volume of legislation concerning 
standards is arguably to increase the likelihood of misconduct through a multiplication of 
the rules there to be broken – and thereby the likelihood of public outcry given the 
‘increasing disengagement of the media in reporting on politics as an activity rather than 
focussing on scandals and personalities’ (Doig, 2004: 448). This, as the recent activities 
and reports of the Standards Committee suggest, then gives rise to demands that 
perceived gaps in the integrity system be plugged – resulting in further reform, and a 
further twist to the circle.10
                                                          
9 The reference here is to the famous ‘seven principles of [conduct in] public life’ (selflessness, integrity, 
objectivity, accountability, openness, honesty, leadership) set out in the Committee’s First Report and 
which have since provided the framework for the adoption of Codes of Conduct throughout the public 
sector. In setting out the principles, the Committee defined ‘honesty’ as meaning that ‘holders of public 
office have a duty to declare any private interests relating to their public duties and to take steps to resolve 
any conflicts arising in a way that protects the public interest’. 
  
 
10 For example, having persuaded Parliament, in the 1990s, to reform itself through acceptance of its 
recommendations for a code of conduct, a Commissioner and more detailed rules on the declaration of 
interests, the Committee on Standards has, on more than one occasion since, reviewed the reforms, each 
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 Third, the growing profile and complexity of the ethical framework increases the 
opportunities for the launching of vexatious complaints and a ‘hightened political tit-for-
tat antagonism’ (Doig, 2004: 444) in conduct cases – which must necessarily contribute 
further to keeping the profile of the issue high.11
 
 
 Fourth, much of the legislative activity described above has ultimately been 
driven by recommendations originating with the Committee on Standards, which has 
interpreted its remit rather broadly. The Seven Principles of Public Life (note 9) which 
have had such a high profile in all the Committee’s public communications (they are 
published at the beginning of all its official documents, for instance) themselves include 
tenets – such as ‘openness’ and ‘leadership’ – whose relevance includes but goes well 
beyond conduct construable as ‘corruption’ narrowly understood. It is not surprising, then, 
that the Standards Committee’s recommendations have touched on issues that border on 
questions of financial probity but actually spill over into other areas (for example, 
discrimination, and freedom of information, as they relate, for example, to impartiality in 
appointments procedures); and the Committee has constantly sought to maximise the area 
and depth of application of its strictures, insisting repeatedly that all public bodies should 
draw up codes of conduct incorporating the seven principles, that these codes should be 
supported by independent scrutiny, and that they should be constantly embedded into 
institutional cultures through guidance and training including induction training. Given 
the sheer breadth of such an approach to standards in public life, it is hardly surprising, 
then, if the public continues to remain anxious. 
 
 Fifth, the Standards Committee and related bodies have been operating in an area 
of policy where it is difficult to formulate rules to achieve the desired objectives that do 
not in some way with other socially desirable ends – and this too, must keep alive public 
discussion of integrity matters. For example, in its First Report, the Standards Committee 
recognised that much of the lack of confidence in the financial probity of MPs had to do 
with ‘the very substantial increase in the number of Members of Parliament employed as 
consultants and advisors to companies, trade associations and the like’ – but set its face 
against restraints on MPs’ freedom to have outside jobs on the not unreasonable grounds 
that a House of Commons without members with a continuing wide variety of outside 
interests ‘would be less well-informed and effective…and might well be more dependent 
on lobbyists’ (Committee on Standards in Public Life, 1995: 21, 23). 
 
 Finally, discussion will have been kept alive by the difficulty of devising rules 
that can offer anything like a guarantee of eliminating misconduct and accusations of 
misconduct. For example, while the Commons’ ‘Guide to the Rules relating to the 
conduct of Members’ is absolutely clear about the obligation on MPs to disclose in any 
                                                                                                                                                                             
time proposing amendment. See, for example, its sixth report and its eighth report available through its web 
site, http://www.public-standards.gov.uk/ 
  
11 It was said, for example, that because of her zealousness, and the way she handled investigations, the 
second Parliamentary Commissioner for Standards, Mrs Elizabeth Filkin, created a climate in which there 
was an increase in cases driven by ulterior, political, motives (Doig, 2004: 444).  
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debate or proceedings ‘any relevant pecuniary interest or benefit of whatever nature, 
whether direct or indirect, that he may have had, may have or may be expecting to have’ 
– the Guide is also frank in its acknowledgement that ‘It is the responsibility of the 
Member, having regard to the rules of the House, to judge whether a pecuniary interest is 
sufficiently relevant to a particular debate, proceeding, meeting or other activity to 
require a declaration’ (House of Commons, 2005: 21, 22). For this reason, too, then, the 
issue of integrity seems set to remain high on the political agenda.  
 
 
Conclusion 
 
The impact of the reform efforts we have described may be an example of Tocqueville’s12 
paradox. This draws attention to the way in which improvements in states of affairs may 
actually increase rather than decrease levels of discontent because of their impact on 
people’s expectations. Paradoxically, the very efforts to address public anxieties may have 
helped to keep such anxieties alive, acting as a self-negating prophecy. If this suggestion 
is true, then matters will not have been helped by what we mentioned as the tendency of the 
Standards Committee to cast its net very widely, often, in choosing areas to investigate, 
going well beyond corruption narrowly construed. In turn this seems related to the 
objective difficulty in knowing precisely what material difference there is between 
corruption of the kind alleged in the ‘cash-for-peerages’ affair,13 favouritism of the kind 
alleged in the appointment of Trevor Phillips as Chair of the Commission for Racial 
Equality14
  
 or deception of the kind alleged in the way in which the events leading to the 
Iraq war were handled. All involve a sacrifice of openness and integrity to the demands 
of practical politics. Concerns about integrity thus seem set to remain high on the 
political agenda; for it is as likely that they are a cause of specific allegations of 
misconduct (by providing fertile ground for media speculation and investigation) as it is 
that they stem from specific allegations – thus pointing to a vicious circle from which it is 
difficult to discern an escape. 
                                                          
12 ‘Tocqueville’s paradox was based on his studies of the French Revolution which led him to observe 
 
that in none of the decades immediately following the Revolution did our national prosperity make 
such rapid forward strides as in the two preceding it…. It is a singular fact that the steadily 
increasing prosperity, far from tranquilizing the population, everywhere promoted a spirit of unrest. 
Moreover, those parts of France in which the improvement in the standard of living was most 
pronounced were the chief centers of the Revolutionary movement….. It was precisely in those 
parts of France where there had been most improvement that popular discontent ran highest. [Pp. 
174-76]’ (Wolf Jnr., 1970: 790)   
 
13 This is the term used by the media to refer to the scandal that broke in early 2006, when the House of 
Lords Appointments Commission rejected a number of the nominations for peerages put forward by the 
Prime Minister. It later emerged that they had loaned large sums of money to the Labour Party, where these 
loans had been kept secret since the 2000 Political Parties, Elections and Referendums Act did not require 
loans, even those given for an indefinite period, to be made a matter of public record, unlike donations.  
 
14 Allegations of bias arose from the fact that Phillips was a former Labour candidate and a friend of many 
senior Labour figures, this raising doubts about the extent to which, in making the appointment, the Home 
Secretary had sacrificed impartiality to the Government’s political agenda in the area of race.  
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Figure 1 CPI scores for the UK 1995 - 2008
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Figure 2 Guardian headlines containing the roots 'corrupt' or 'bribe' or 'embezzle' or 'fraud' or 
'sleaze'
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Figure 3 Headlines containing the roots 'corrupt' or 'bribe' or 'embezzle' or 'fraud' or 'sleaze' in The 
Age (Melbourne), The Jerusalem Post, the Irish Times
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Figure 4 Scatter plot of CPI scores and general 
election turnouts, EU-27, 1995-2008
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Note: each point represents the turnout at a general election in one of the EU-27 countries, 
and the corresponding CPI score for that country in the given year. The figure is based on 
all elections in all the countries between 1995 and 2008 for which the relevant data were 
available. Pearson product-moment correlation coefficient = 0.37 
 
Source: own elaboration based on election turnout data taken from the International 
Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance website (http://www.idea.int/) and on 
CPI scores taken from the Transparency International website (http://www. 
transparency.org/) 
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Table 1 Groups trusted or not trusted to tell the truth, 1983, 1993, 2003 
 
 
 Tell truth Not tell truth Net 
improvement 
1983 – 2003 
 1983 1993  2003 1983 1993 2003 1983 – 2003 
 % %  % % % % + % 
Doctors 82 84 Family doctors 92 14 11 8 +16 
Teachers 79 84 Head teachers in 
schools 
83 14 9 13 +5 
Judges 77 68 Judges 79 18 21 16 +4 
The Police 61 63 Local police officers on 
the beat in your area 
77 32 26 17 +21* 
Senior police officers 67   27  
Television 
news readers 
63 72 Television news 
journalists 
49 25 18 46 –35 
Civil servants 25 37 Top civil servants 37 63 50 54 +21 
Politicians 
generally 
18 14 MPs in general 28 75 79 66  +19 
Government 
ministers 
16 11 Government ministers 24 74 81 69 +13 
Business 
leaders 
25 32 People who run large 
companies 
23 65 57 68 – 5 
Journalists 19 10 Journalists on 
newspapers like the Sun 
the Mirror  or the Daily 
Star 
7 73 84 89 – 28  
 
Sources: Mortimore, 1995, table 2; Survey of public attitudes towards conduct in public life 2003-04, 
BMRB Research. 
 
Notes:  
In 1983 and 1993, the question was: ‘Now I will read out a list of different types of people. For each would 
you tell me whether you generally trust them to tell the truth or not?’ In 2003, the question was: ‘These 
cards show different types of people. Please put them on this board to show which you would generally 
trust to tell the truth and which you wouldn’t’ 
* Net improvement calculated by using, for 2003, the mean scores for ‘local police officers on the beat in 
your area’ and ‘senior police officers’ 
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Table 2 Predictors of trust in MPs generally to tell the truth (logistic regressions) 
 
 
Variable Significance Exp(B) 
Age 65+ 0.333 0.857 
Age 55-64 0.042* 1.534 
Age 45-54 0.872 0.972 
Age 35-44 0.644 0.925 
Age 25-34 0.877 1.029 
Degree 0.795 1.054 
Higher ed. diploma 0.871 1.037 
A levels 0.679 0.908 
Trade apprenticeship 0.243 1.370 
GCSE Advanced level 0.057 1.584 
GCSE Ordinary level 0.591 0.889 
Intermediate occupation 0.365 1.175 
Routine/manual occupation 0.982 0.009 
Never worked 0.124 0.566 
Full-time student 0.346 1.505 
Interest current affairs: quite a lot 0.185 0.827 
Interest current affairs: some 0.551 1.092 
Interest current affairs: not very much 0.467 1.138 
Interest current affairs: none 0.650 0.860 
Can influence decisions: agree 0.000* 0.476 
Can influence decisions: neither agree nor disagree 0.066 0.723 
Can influence decisions: disagree 0.013* 1.425 
Can influence decisions: strongly disagree 0.000* 2.057 
Trust others 0.000* 2.142 
 
Source: Survey of public attitudes towards conduct in public life 2003-04, BMRB 
Research. 
 
Note: * = p< 0.05 
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Table 3 Results of modified logistic regression model for predictors of trust in MPs to tell 
the truth 
 
 Regression 
coefficients 
Significance Odds 
ratio  
95% confidence 
interval for odds ratio 
Can influence 
decisions: disagree 
0.642 0.000 1.900 1.401 2.577 
Can influence 
decisions: strongly 
disagree 
0.925 0.000 2.522 1.669 3.810 
Trust others 0.687 0.000 1.988 1.502 2.632 
Constant 0.052 0.683 1.053   
Hosmer and Lemeshow Test Sig. = 0.825 
 
Source: Survey of public attitudes towards conduct in public life 2003-04, BMRB 
Research. 
 
